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COMMENT
THAT "THORNY ISSUE"l REDUX:
CALIFORNIA GRANDPARENT
VISITATION LAW IN THE WAKE OF

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE2
JOAN CATHERINE BOHL

*

INTRODUCTION

By the time the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the
constitutionality of court-ordered grandparent visitation by deciding
Troxel v. Granville in June of 2000, the issue already had a nearly thirtyyear history; almost all state courts had contributed. 3 In some states the
* Instructor of Legal Writing, Stetson University College of Law. Portions of this article
were presented at the 12th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law in Salt
Lake City, Utah on July 21, 2005.
I Butler v. Harris (In re Marriage of Harris), 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004) [hereafter Butler 1I].
2 Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57 (2000)
3 ALABAMA, B.R.O. v. G.C.O., 646 So. 2d 126 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), ALASKA, Brown
v. Brown, 914 P.2d 206 (Alaska 1996); ARIZONA, Graville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999); ARKANSAS, Reed v. Glover, 889 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994); CALIFORNIA, Benner v.
Benner, 248 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1952); COLORADO, In re Marriage of Aragon, 764 P.2d 419 (Colo.
1988); CONNECTICUT, Mirto v. Bodine, 294 A.2d 336 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); DELAWARE,
Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam.l987); FLORIDA, Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Aa.
1996), GEORGIA, Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); HAW All, Camerlingo v.
Camerlingo, 961 P.2d 1162 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); IDAHO, ILLINOIS, West v. West, 689 N.E.2d
1215 (llI. App. Ct. 1998); INDIANA, Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989);
IOWA, aids v. aids, 356 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1984); KANSAS, Sowers v. Tsamolias, 941 P.2d 949
(Kan. 1997) (adoption involved); KENTUCKY, King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992);
LOUISIANA, Lingo v. Kelsay, 651 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 1995); MAINE, MARYLAND,
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opposing parties on the issue had settled into an uneasy truce, at least on
some issues. 4 In many more states a tug-of-war continued, in which
legislatures expanded grandparents' rights to sue,5 only to have state
court judges reject legislative expansion of grandparents visitation rights,
citing parental privacy.6 When the United States Supreme Court agreed
Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A2d 30 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); MASSACHUSETTS, Enos v.
Correia,647 N.W.2d 1215 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995); MICHIGAN, Frame v. Nehls, 550 N.W.2d 739
(Mich. 1996); MINNESOTA, Petition of Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998);
MISSISSIPPI, Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997); MISSOURI, Herndon v. Tuhey, 857
SW.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); MONTANA, Kanvick v. Reilly, 760 P.2d 743 (Mont. 1988) (adoption
involved); NEBRASKA, Beal v. Endsley, 529 N.W.2d 125 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); NEVADA, Bopp
v. Lino, 885 P.2d 559 (Nev. 1994) (adoption involved); NEW HAMPSHIRE, Roberts v. Ward,493
A2d 478 (N.H. 1985); NEW JERSEY, Becker v. Becker, 620 A.2d 1092 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1992); NEW MEXICO, Ridenour v. Ridenour, 901 P.2d 770 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); NEW YORK,
State ex rei. Foley v. Landberg, 151 AD.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); NORTH CAROLINA,
Acker v. Barnes, 236 S.E.2d 715 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (adoption involved); NORTH DAKOTA,
Hoffv. Berg, 595 NW.2d 285 (N.D. 1999); OHIO, Gaffney v. Menrath, 724 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1999); OKLAHOMA, Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1980) (adoption involved);
OREGON, Machado v. Uri, 767 P.2d 106 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); PENNSYLVANIA, Bishop v. Piller,
581 A2d 670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); RHODE ISLAND, In re Nicholas, 457 A2d 1359 (R.I. 1983)
(adoption involved); SOUTH CAROLINA, Brown v. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990);
SOUTH DAKOTA, Strouse v. Olson, 397 N.W.2d 651 (S.D. 1986); TENNESSEE, Simmons v.
Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995) (adoption involved); TEXAS, Tope v. Kaminski, 793
S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); UTAH, Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App.
1995); VERMONT, In re S.B.L, 553 A.2d 1078 (Vt. 1988); VIRGINIA, Williams v. Williams, 501
S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998); WASHINGTON, Bond v. Yount, 734 P.2d 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)
(adoption involved); WEST VIRGINIA, Elmer Jimmy S. v. Kenneth B., 483 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va.
1997); WISCONSIN, Soergel v. Raufman, 453 N.W.2d 624 (Wis. 1990) (adoption involved);
WYOMING, Goffv. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087 (Wyo. 1993).
4 In Tennessee, for example, the requirement that a grandparent demonstrate that courtordered visitation was necessary to avoid harm to the child was initially denounced as the end of
court-ordered grandparent visitation. In practice, however, this threshold certainly did not preclude
all awards of grandparent visitation. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Hilliard, No. 02AOI-9609-CH-00230,
1997 WL 61510 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1997) (noting that court-ordered visitation was appropriate
because the maternal grandmother had served in a maternal role to the child).
5 Examples are found in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577
& n.l (Tenn. 1993) (describing the progressive expansion of Tenn. Code Ann. Section 36-6-301);
McMain v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 559 N.W.2d 12, 18-19 (Iowa 1997) (describing the
progressive expansion of "statutory circumstances for granting grandchild visitation with
grandparents" under Iowa law); Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27, 28-29 (N.Y. 1991)
(describing the progressive expansion of grandparent visitation rights under N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law
Section 72); Maner v. Stephenson, 677 A.2d 560, 562-63 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) (describing the
progressive expansion of grandparent visitation rights under Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. Section 9102 (1999)).
6 "Reading the statute literally ... § 46b-59 allows any person, under any circumstances, to
petition the court for visitation rights, no matter how remote his or her connection to the child ...
Such a construction would be a ... radical departure from the deeply ingrained tradition of family
autonomy in such matters [and] would raise serious concerns about the effect of the statute on intact
families and the constitutionally protected privacy interests of those families .... " Castagno v.
Wholean, 684 A.2d 1181,1184 (Conn. 1996), overruled by Roth v. Weston, 789 A2d 431 (Conn.
2002). Six years later the Connecticut Supreme Court took further steps to "provid[e] a judicial
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to hear Troxel, court watchers predicted major changes in grandparent
visitation law. 7 When experts read the newly minted decision, they
speculated on the dramatic theoretical changes it could trigger. When
state courts actually shouldered the task of applying Troxel, it became
apparent that although the changes it produced were not theoretically
dramatic, they may ultimately have more practical impact than predicted.
This article is about Troxel's practical impact as it has played out in the
laboratory of the California court system.
To understand Troxel's effect, one must first understand the legal
and social landscape that preceded it. Accordingly, the first section of
this article explores the political and societal origins of grandparent
VIsItation statutes. It also reviews the basic types of grandparent
visitation statutes and the arguments made on each side of a typical preTroxel grandparent visitation suit. This section explains how these
arguments evolved nationally over time, and how each was treated in the
courts.
The second step in understanding Troxel's effect is to understand
the decision itself. Troxel is a plurality opinion. 8 Although the
individual concurrences and dissents will be of interest to constitutional
scholars for years to come, the real importance of the decision, for state
courts which must implement it, is found in Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion. 9 The second part of this article, therefore, reviews the
plurality's decision and relates aspects of it to the corresponding
principles in pre-Troxel decisional law.
In a third section, the article analyzes judicial responses to Troxel,
focusing on California grandparent visitation decisions. This group of
decisions is an ideal laboratory for several reasons. First, the California
grandparent visitation scheme IO differs significantly from the grandparent
gloss" that would protect parental autonomy in the context of grandparent visitation by requiring that
a court find the child would suffer harm absent visitation before awarding visitation over the parent's
objection. Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 436 (Conn. 2(02). For a strikingly similar judicial effort
to salvage a strikingly similar grandparent visitation statute see In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d
698 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 503 U.S. 57 (2000).
7 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Fractured Families at Core of Visitation Issue; Law: Single
parents chafeat coun orders granting privileges to grandparents. Supreme Coun to Decide Case,
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at AI (2000 WL 2243407).
8 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion, and was joined by
the Chief Justice and by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer. Id. at 80. Justices Souter and Thomas
concurred in the judgment, writing separate opinions. [d. at 75, 80. Justices Stevens, Scalia and
Kennedy each filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 80, 91, 93.
9 See, e.g., Kyle O. v. Donald R., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 485-86 (Ct. App. 20(0) (applying
the Troxel majority opinion only).
10 California's statutory scheme provides three separate avenues for a grandparent seeking
court-ordered visitation. Basically, a grandparent has standing when one parent has died (Cal. Fam.
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visitation statute at issue in Troxel. Troxel involved Washington state's
"breathtakingly broad"l1 statute, which imposed no limitations on who
could sue for visitation or when suit could be brought. 12 This simplified
the Troxel plurality'S analysis considerably. Such unbounded statutory
discretion made it unnecessary for Troxel to address the potential impact
of family status, for example, on parental rights. \3 Most grandparent
visitation statutes are more like California's statutes than the statute at
issue in Troxel, however, and many - like California's - do condition
some causes of action and some parental rights on family status. 14 Thus,
Code § 3102 (2005)). or when the child's parents are seeking a divorce. Cal. Fam. Code § 3103
(2005). A third catch-all provision confers standing regardless of any disruption of the child's
family, but includes the caveat that if the parents are united in their opposition to the visitation, a
rebuttable presumption arises that grandparent visitation is not in the best interests of the child. [d. §
3 103 (d) (2005).
II Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
12 Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (2005) provided that "any person" could petition for
visitation "at any time," and that the petition could be granted simply upon a finding that "visitation
may serve the best interest of the child."
13 See infra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
14 Nineteen states have "open-ended" grandparent visitation statutes - statutes that permit
grandparents to file suit regardless of the parents' marital status:
ALABAMA, Ala. Code § 30-3-4.1 (1989); ALASKA, Alaska Stat. § 25.20.065 (1998); ARIZONA,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-409 (1994); COLORADO, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-117 (1999);
DELAWARE, Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (1999); HAWAII, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46.3
(1999); IDAHO, Idaho Code § 32-719 (1999); KANSAS, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-129 (1993);
KENTUCKY, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021 (Banks-Baldwin 1990); MAINE, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 19A, § 1803 (West 1998); MARYLAND, Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 9-102 (1999); NEW
JERSEY, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1999-2000); NEW YORK, N. Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 72
(McKinney 1999); NORTH DAKOTA, N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-05.1 (1997); OREGON, Or. Rev.
Stat. § 109.119 (2001); RHODE ISLAND, R.1. Gen. Laws §§ 15-5-24 - 15-5-24.3 (1999); SOUTH
DAKOTA, S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4-52 (Michie 1999); VERMONT, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§
1011-1013 (1989); VIRGINIA, Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2 (Michie 1995); WASHINGTON, Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.10.100 (West 2005); WEST VIRGINIA, W. Va. Code §§ 48-2B-l - 48-2B-7 (1999)
(current version at W. Va. Code § 48-10-101, et seq.); WISCONSIN, Wis. Stat. §§ 767.245, 880.155
(1993-1994); WYOMING, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1999).
All other states have "closed-ended" statutes and do not permit a grandparent to seek court-ordered
visitation when the child lives in an intact family:
ARKANSAS, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); CALIFORNIA, Cal. Fam. Code § 3104
(West 1994); CONNECTICUT, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 (1995) (threshold requirement imposed
by judicial decision); FLORIDA, Aa. Stat. ch. 752.01 (1997); GEORGIA, Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3
(1991); ILLINOIS, TIl. Compo Stat. 5/607 (1998); INDIANA, Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1 (1999) IOWA,
Iowa Code § 598.35 (1999); LOUISIANA, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:344 (West Supp. 2000), La. Civ.
Code Ann. art. 136 (West Supp. 2000); MASSACHUSETTS, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 390
(1996); MICHIGAN, Mich. Compo Laws Ann. § 722.27b (West Supp. 1999); MINNESOTA, Minn.
Stat. § 257.D22 (1998) (current version at Minn. Stat. § 257C.08 (2005)); MISSISSIPPI, Miss. Code
Ann. § 93-16-3 (1994); MISSOURI, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.402 (Supp. 1999); MONTANA, Mont.
Code Ann. § 40-9-102 (1997); NEBRASKA, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802 (1998); NEVADA, Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 125C.050 (1999); NEW HAMPSHIRE, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17-d (1992); NEW
MEXICO, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1999); NORTH CAROLINA, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 5013.2, 50-13.2A (1999); OHIO, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3109.051, 3109.11 (West 1999);
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simply to decide the grandparent visitation case before it, most state
courts must do what the California courts have done, and extrapolate
Troxel principles to cover statutory distinctions that Troxel ignored.
Second, California's statutory scheme has forced California courts
to address a key Troxel concept: courts ordering visitation must give the
parent's wishes "special weight." Two of California's three grandparent
visitation statutes purportedly protect parents' rights by creating a
rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is contrary to the best
interests of the child when both parents agree that it is. IS Is this the
protection the United States Supreme Court envisioned? Clearly a court
can give special weight to a parent's preferences by simply deferring to
the parent's proposed visitation schedule; this, in fact, is what Troxel
itself seems to recommend. 16 But does any proposed schedule deserve
deference? And what happens to the special-weight requirement if the
parental right must be somehow apportioned between two parents who
disagree? California courts have addressed these questions in light of
Troxel, and so can provide a window into the future of grandparent
visitation law. A final section of the article comments on the view from
this window. Although Troxel carefully avoids established analyses and
adds new terms to the language of grandparent visitation law, courts
struggling to extend Troxel's concepts have drawn on and incorporated
pre-Troxel principles to do so. Ultimately, the view from this window
may not be so different after all.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION LAW

Grandparent visitation statutes are creatures of mid to late 20th
century America, arising from the social, political and economic changes
of that time. At common law, grandparents had no legal right of contact
with their grandchildren.17 A child's parents decided with whom the
child would associate and, as far as grandparents were concerned, the
parents' decision was constrained, if at all, by moral rather than legal
forces. 18
OKLAHOMA, Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 5 (1999); PENNSYLVANIA, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5311-5313
(l99\); South Carolina, S.c. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1999); TENNESSEE, Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 36-6-306, 36-.6-307 (1999); TEXAS, Tex. Fam. Code § 153.433 (Vernon 2000);
UTAH, Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1998).
15 Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3103(d), 3104(e) (2005).
16 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
17 See, e.g., White v. Jacobs, 243 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting that grandparent
visitation rights are purely statutory).
IBln re Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894) is one of the earliest judicial statements of this
proposition and is generally representative of the position of early courts in the absence of
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Indeed, grandparents themselves were virtually unknown at
common law given typicallifespans. 19 Even at the turn of the twentieth
century, an average American died just before reaching 50. 20 By 1960,
average Americans could expect to live to nearly 70. 21 Between the
beginning of the twentieth century and its latter decades, elderly
Americans also began to enjoy unprecedented good health. Medical
advances nearly eliminated tuberculosis, for example, and antibiotics
made it possible to contain influenza and pneumonia. 22 Although
diseases of prosperity and old age, like cancer and cardiovascular disease
remained nearly constant or increased slightly,23 this slight increase in
mortality did not begin to outweigh the medical advancements
contributing to a healthy old age.
In addition to living longer, healthier lives, by the mid twentieth
century elderly people became an increasingly independent group in
other respects. At the beginning of the twentieth century, elderly people
generally lived with relatives;24 by 1960, however, 2.9 million
Americans over 65 lived alone. 25 Every year after 1960, the number of
elderly living alone increased. 26 At the turn of the twentieth century,
grandparent visitation legislation. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Familiesfor Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (natural family has "its origins entirely apart from the power of the State ...
[and] the liberty interest in family privacy has its source ... not in state law [footnote omitted] but in
intrinsic human rights ... ") (citing Moore V. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see Deweese V.
Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 59 AM. JUR. 2E Parent and
Child § 92 (1987); George L. Blum, Annotation, Grandparent's Visitation Rights Where Child's
Parents Are Deceased, Or Where Status Of Parents Is Unspecified, 69 A.L.R. 5th I, I (2005);
George L. Blum, Annotation, Grandparents' Visitation Rights Where Child's Parents Are Living, 7\
A.L.R. 5th 99, 99 (2005); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
149 (1897); for a discussion of the common law concept of family in its historical context see J.
Bohl, "Those Privileges Long Recognized": Termination of Parental Rights Statutes, the Family
Integrity Right and the Private Culture of the Family, I CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.1. 323, 328-33
(1994).
19 LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 71-72
(1977).
20 REBECCAJ. DONATELLE & LoRRAINE G. DAVIS, ACCESS To HEALTH 475 (3d ed. 1994).
21 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Comm., Statistical Abstract of the United States 8788 (1994).
22 1900-1970, U.S. Public Health Service, Vital Statistics of the United States, annual, Vol. I
and Vol II; From Statistical Abstract of the United States,: 2004-2005; available at
http://www.infoplease.com/ipaJA0922292.html(last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (showing in chart form
that between 1900 and 2002, deaths from influenza and pneumonia fell from 202.2 per 100,000
Americans to just 22.7 per thousand).
23 Id.
24 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Households, Families and Married
Couples, 1890-2002, available at http://www.infoplease.com/ipaJAOOO5055.htmlon 5/3\/2005.
25 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't ofComm., Demographic Trends in the 20th Century 155
(2002).
26 Id.
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even those Americans lucky enough to enter their golden years in good
health rarely had the financial security necessary for leisure. Social
Security began paying benefits in 1940, but the full phase-in of those
benefits and the corresponding development of private pensions took
most of the next twenty years.27 These turn-of-the-century elders also
lacked the political voice that is an accepted part of the American
political landscape today. With the advent of the American Association
of Retired Persons (AARP) in 195828 came steadily increasing political
power, effective lobbying and a voting rate for older Americans that
increased even faster than the absolute increase in the elderly
· 29
popuI atIOn.
The parents' side of the grandparent visitation equation also
changed significantly between the turn of the twentieth century and its
latter half. In 1910, divorce occurred at a rate of less than one per
thousand people. 3o By 1965,2.5 marriages per thousand people ended in
divorce and the next decade saw that rate virtually double. 3] By 1975,
the people who had divorced were remarrying at a rate of approximately
80%32 combining children from previous marriages into a single
household and creating "blended families.,,33
27 Watson
Wyatt - Insider, The Early Economics of Social Security at
http://www.watsonwyatt.comlus/pubs/insider/printab Ie. asp ?ArticIeID=8 378&Component=
(las t
visited May 31, 2005 (citing United States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1975) p. 348.
28 AARP
History,
http://www.aarp.org/aboucaarp/aarp_overview/a2003-01-13aarphistory.html (last visited Aug. II, 2005).
29 65.1 % of the 23 million Americans 65 years of age and older in 1984 voted, whereas
70.1 % of the 30.8 million Americans 65 years of age and older voted in 1992. Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dept. of Comm., Statistical Abstract of the United States 87-88 (1994). Compare the
voting rate for older Americans in 1992 (70.1 %) with the voting rates in 1992 for those most likely
to be parents: 53.2% of those aged 25-34 voted, while 63.6% of those aged 35-44 voted. Id.; see
also Grandparents Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Services of the House of Representatives Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Congo 9 (1991) (Opening
Statements of Chairman Thomas J. Downey (noting that approximately three quarters of older
Americans are grandparents and that "[ilt is a well-known fact that seniors are the most active lobby
in this country")).
30 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1975, 51 (96th Annual Ed.) Washington D.C.
1975.
31 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1976, 359 (97th Annual Ed.) Washington D.C.
1976.
32 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Special
Studies Series, 20, No. 312, Marriage, Divorce, Widowhood and Remarriage by Family
Characteristics: June 1975,8-10 (1977).
33 A blended family is 'a family composed of a couple and their children from previous
marriages.' The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d Ed. Unabridged 1987). The
term "blended family" was developed to describe a "stepfamily" without the negative implications
of "stepmother" etc. See, e.g., John H. Harvey & Ann L. Weber, ODYSSEY OF THE HEART: CLOSE
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 129 (2002); Ann L. Milne, et aI., DIVORCE AND FAMILY
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Never-married single parents also became an acceptable variation of
American family life. Although these statistics are imprecise,34 the
general trend is clear. In 1970, 11 % of all children born in the United
States were born to unmarried women; by 1991, that percentage had
almost tripled, increasing to 30%.35 This acceptance of illegitimacy was
permanently enshrined in American popular culture by a series of
episodes in "Murphy Brown," a television situation comedy originally
airing in 1992, in which the female protagonist becomes pregnant,
decides not to marry the father of her child but, to instead, raise the baby
on her own. One single mother, responding to the story line, was quoted
as saying "Murphy Brown creates a feeling of belonging to the new
American family.,,36
Even traditional nuclear families, untouched by divorce, changed
dramatically as mothers joined the workforce. In 1950, 11.9% of
married women with children under six years of age worked outside the
home. 37 By 1965, that figure had more than doubled to 23.3%.38 By the
end of the next decade, more than one out of every three married mothers
of small children worked outside the home. 39 "Parenthood" no longer
necessarily referred to married natural parents of children living together,
with mothers at home, caring for the youngest. 40
The same decades that saw such extensive change in family
structure were also a period of some clearly negative social trends
outside the family circle. Dependency cases-defined as cases in which
children eighteen years of age and younger were referred to the court
because of inadequate care and supervision-nearly doubled between
1960 and 1973.41 During this same period, cases of juvenile delinquency

MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 336 (1994) (discussing characteristics and
common myths of blended families).
34 STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 240 (The Oryx Press, Bruce A.
Chadwick & Tim B. Heaton eds., 1992).
35 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 87-88
(1994).
36 James Rowley, More and More Unwed Women Bearing Children, AP, July 14, 1993,
available in Lexis, News Library, AP File.
37 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1976, 359 (97th Annual Ed.) Washington D.C.
1976.
38 1d.
39 ln 1975, 36.6% of women with children under 6 years old worked outside the home. [d.
40 For an interesting discussion of the theoretical basis for parenthood given these social
changes, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984).
41 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1975, 166 (96th Annual Ed.) Washington D.C.
1975.
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increased by more than one third. 42 Although sociologists may debate
the correlation between a changing family structure and this particular set
of social ills, they were firmly linked in popular opinion. 43
The 1960's and 70's thus dawned on a graying America in which
newly politicized elders could look forward to years of financial security,
independent living and leisure. These elders had a front row seat as
social ills multiplied and family structure appeared to disintegrate; and
the political muscle to exert some control over the familial changes they
saw. In hindsight, it is hardly surprising that grandparent visitation
statutes were created, or that, in their earliest incarnation, they were
linked to family structure.
Some early grandparent visitation statutes, for example, conferred a
right to sue for court-ordered visitation when the grandparent's own child
had died, creating, in effect, a specific derivative right of access to a
grandchild. 44 Other early grandparent visitation cases focused on the
reality that grandparents were increasingly likely to serve as emergency
caretakers in a world of "stripped down families," and provided a right of
access when grandparent and grandchild had already established a close
relationship. In Goodman v. Dratch,45 for example, the grandchild,
Michael, lived with his maternal grandparents for about a year after his
mother died, and saw his father only in the evenings. When the father
remarried and established a new home for himself, his new wife and
Michael, he also attempted to cut off contact between Michael and his
grandparents. The grandparents' suit for visitation was successful; the
court noted that the grandparents had "occupied the position of parents to
the child.,,46
As grandparent visitation statutes became more common, however,
and as elder Americans flexed their political muscle, the character of
grandparent visitation statutes had changed. By 1991, all states had
enacted grandparent visitation statutes. 47 And all of these statutes were
more general than the early ones; the new statutes conferred rights based
simply on the fact of grandparenthood rather than on a specific role the
grandparent played in the grandchild's life. Thus, for example, New

1d.
43 See. e.g •. Graziano v. Davis, 361 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
44 See, e.g., Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27,28 (N.Y. 1991) (describing New York's
original grandparent visitation statute).
45 Commonwealth ex rei Goodman v. Dratch, 159 A.2d 70 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1960).
46 ld . at 71.
47 Most states had enacted grandparent visitation statutes by the late 1980' s; Maine enacted
its statute in 1991: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 19 § 1003 (1991) derived from Laws 1991, c 414
(repealed 1995).
42
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York's grandparent visitation statute, as enacted in 1966, provided a
grandparent with a right to seek court-ordered visitation only when the
grandparent's own child had died. 48 By 1975, the statute was amended
to confer standing on a grandparent when either of the grandchild's
parents had died, or whenever "equity would see fit to intervene.,,49 The
pattern was set: all modern grandparent visitation statutes fit one of two
models. Some grandparent visitation statutes attach no preconditions to
suit, while others require only some general disruptive precipitating
event in the child's family.5o
A.

EARLY GRANDPARENT VISITATION LITIGATION

The earliest grandparent visitation suits followed a simple pattern.
Plaintiff grandparents alleged that grandparent visitation was in the best
interest of the child. 51 Parents disputed this, often alleging that the
grandparent's suit was motivated by spite,52 or that visitation would be
disruptive to the child. 53 The grandparents generally won, often in
subjective and sentimental decisions that idealized grandparentallove. 54
A change occurred in the 1980's, when an increasing number of
defendant-parents began making a constitutional argument against
grandparent visitation. 55 The parents argued that ordering grandparent
visitation over the objections of fit parents violated the parents' right to
child rearing autonomy absent a showing of harm. The parents based
this argument on the principle that only the state may countermand a fit
parent's childrearing decision when the countermand is necessary to
avoid harm to the child. 56 Absent that showing of harm, they argued,
48 See Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 560 N.Y.S. 2d 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (explaining the
evolution of New York's grandparent visitation statute) (citing N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 72 as
amended by L. 1966, ch. 631), rev'd by 577 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
49 ld . (citing N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 72 as amended by L. 1975, ch. 431).
50 See supra note 10.
51 See, e.g., Graziano, 361 N.E.2d at 526-27.
52 ld. at 527.
53 Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199,206 (N.J. 1975).
54 See, e.g., id. at 204 (referring to grandparents as "generous sources of unconditional love
and acceptance").
55 See, e.g., Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E. 2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Frances E. v. Peter E.,
479 N.Y.S. 2d 319 (1984).
56 One of the most often cited statements of the harm standard in American Constitutional
jurisprudence was cited in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), in which the Court
countermanded the parent's decision to allow her child to sell magazines on the street citing the
psychological and physical injury the child could sustain. ld. at 178. For a current discussion of the
harm standard in the context of grandparent visitation, see Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent
Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward Awarding Visitation Only When The Child Would
Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 279, 286 (2000).
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parents and child occupied a private realm of family life that the state
could not enter. 57
These early constitutional arguments were resoundingly
unsuccessful. Some courts simply ignored them. 58 Most courts
dismissed them with minimal discussion, often citing to best interests of
the child tests that actually have nothing to do with the parents' harm
arguments. 59
This state of affairs persisted for years,60 making grandparent
visitation law, in effect, the illegitimate stepchild of family law. In other
state actions that implicate parental rights, such as abuse and neglect
cases, or medical treatment cases, courts used a "harm standard." So, for
example, if a child risked death or disfigurement without certain medical
treatment, a court would order the treatment over the parents'
objection. 61 If the parent merely wanted to pursue one medically
acceptable course of treatment over another, on the other hand, no
judicial intervention would be appropriate. 62 Indeed, the court is
literally without authority to countermand the parent's decision unless
that decision threatened to harm the child. 63 In grandparent visitation
cases, however, most opinions in the 1980's and early 1990's simply
ignored these governing principles of family law, and rested decisions

57 In Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993), the court explains that an initial showing
of hann to a child is a necessary prerequisite to any best interests of the child analysis in order to
"balance[] various state interests against parental privacy rights," (id. at 580), tracing this concept
through United States Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 580-82.
58 See, e.g., La Presti v. La Presti, 355 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1976) (court simply never
addresses counsel's constitutional argument); Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 560 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1990) (court expresses doubt that it has power to pass on the constitutional issue, then
declines to do so).
59 See, e.g., Frances E. v. Peter E., 479 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984); Bailey v.
Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
60 One of the most dramatic shifts occurred over a twelve year period in Connecticut. In
1990, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to directly discuss the constitutionality of its
grandparent visitation statute, although assuming its constitutionality in dicta. Lehrer v. Davis, 571
A.2d 691 (Conn. 1990). In 2002, the Connecticut Supreme Court revisited the issue, interpreting the
same statute to require a threshold finding ofhann. Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002).
61 See, e.g., Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Sup. Ct.
1985) (holding that state authority to override parental decision-making is limited to alleviating
direct and immediate threats to the child).
62 Id.; see, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting)
(contrasting the statement of parental rights in a recent Kentucky custody case with the absence of
any recognition of the same right in the context of grandparent visitation.).
63 See, generally, J.C. Bohl, Brave New Statutes: Grandparent Visitation Statutes as
Unconstitutional Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State Power, GEO. MASON UNIV.
CIVIL RTS. L.1. 271,288 (1993) (discussing theories under which the state may countermand parental
decisions).
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instead on pure sentiment. 64 Given this sentimental approach, perhaps it
should not be surprising that some justices ignored even the prior
grandparent visitation decisions from their own jurisdictions.65 By
circumventing the accepted principles of family law, grandparent
visitation law occupied its discredited fringe 66 until 1993, when the
Tennessee Supreme Court decided Hawk v. Hawk.
B.

A SEA CHANGE67 IN GRANDPARENT VISITATION LITIGATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS RECEIVE RECOGNITION

Hawk v. Hawk68 began, as most grandparent visitation cases have,

as an unremarkable dispute between parents: in this case, the married,
natural parents of two children aged three and five at the time of the
initial petition69 and the paternal grandparents. 7o The parents did not
want the grandparents to spank the children; the grandparents felt they
should be free to discipline the children as they saw fit. 71 The
grandparents were unwilling to comply with the parents' wishes
regarding the children's bedtimes and activities.72
The parents
complained that the grandparents used the parents' objections to make
them the "bad guys" in front of the children. 73 The parents cut off
contact with the grandparents, and the grandparents sued.74 The parents
64 See, e.g., Frances E. v. Peter E., 479 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (quoting
Ehrlich v. Ressner, 55 N.Y.S.2d 152 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977); Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 355 N.E.2d 372
(N.Y. 1976); Johansen v. Lanphear, 464 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983» (describing the
policy underlying the grandparent visitation statute: "Visits with a grandparent are often a precious
part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild ... which he
cannot derive from any other relationship").
65 Missouri law provided that visitation could be awarded only if unreasonably denied by the
parents for at least 90 days. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.402 (1992). Although the Missouri Supreme Court
specifically addressed this provision in Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993), it made no
mention of a Missouri Appellate Court decision that had specifically addressed the same provision
two years earlier. See Farrell v. Denson, 821 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
66 See, e.g., Joan C. Bohl, Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation: How Precedent Fell
Prey to Sentiment in Herndon v. Tuhey, 62 MO. L. REV. 755, 771-75 (1997).
67 Sea Change: I. A striking change ... often for the better, 2. Any major transformation or
alteration. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICfIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1725 (2d ed.
unabridged, Random House 1987).
68 Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
69 Application for Permission to Appeal to the Supreme Court at 7, Hawk v. Hawk, 855
S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (No. 996 Court of Appeals).
70 Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575.
71 Application for Permission to Appeal to the Supreme Court at 8, Hawk v. Hawk, 855
S.w.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (No. 996 Court of Appeals).

72

/d.

73

[d. at 10; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575-76.
The grandparents sued pursuant to Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute, T.C.A. § 36-

74
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lost at the initial hearing; the trial judge did not address the parents'
constitutional arguments at all, and instead awarded the grandparents
unsupervised visitation and attached no restrictions. The court went on
to announce that "the Court is fully convinced that [the grandparents]
would not do anything or take these children anywhere that would
adversely affect [them].,,75 The parents appealed to the Tennessee
Supreme Court. 76
For the first time since grandparent visitation appeared on the legal
landscape, a state supreme court gave serious attention to its
constitutional implications. 77 The court noted, first, that the right at stake
was childbearing autonomy, which was protected under Tennessee law
from state interference "except where the child's welfare is materially
jeopardized,,78 by parental actions. The court reviewed the United States
Supreme Court's affirmance that childrearing autonomy includes
parents' right to direct the upbringing and education of their children,79
unless their choices jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or create
significant social burdens. 80 The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court recognized childrearing autonomy as fundamental to both
federal constitutional jurisprudence and to the concept of a private realm
to family life. 8l Parental rights thus implicate the entire panoply of
privacy rights inherent in the Federal Constitution.
The Tennessee Supreme Court thus concluded that a grandparent
visitation suit was a direct challenge to a fundamental privacy interest.
"Without a substantial danger of harm to the child,,,82 the court held, a
parental decision regarding visitation could not be countermanded simply
because the trial justice believed he could make a better decision. 83 And
although the court elaborated extensively on the federal constitutional
basis for this conclusion, it rested its holding exclusively on the state

6-301, which allowed "a court to order 'reasonable visitation' with grandparents if it is 'in the best
interests of the minor child.'" Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 576-77.
7S Id.
76 [d. at 575 (stating it "granted review in this case primarily to decide the constitutionality of
T.e.A. s 36-6-301").
77 [d. at 573. This is not to minimize the importance of individual justices whose often
impassioned criticisms of grandparent visitation surely primed the country's collective legal
consciousness.
78 [d. at 578.
79 Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y ojSisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
80 Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972)).
81 [d. at 578-79.
82 Id. at 579.
83 Id. at 580-81 (citing Kathleen Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24
U. LoUISVILLEJ. FAM.L. 393, 441 (1985-86).
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constitution,84 thereby insulating it from any further review.
By addressing the constitutional issues raised in detail and
supporting each conclusion with citations to Tennessee cases, the Hawk
court took two remarkable steps forward.
First, it legitimized
grandparent visitation law; it did not rest any aspect of any conclusion on
sentiment. In fact, Hawk expressly disapproved of decisions in other
jurisdictions which had. 85 Furthermore, Hawk used settled principles in
Tennessee family law. Thus, to establish the nature of the right at stake,
the court cited Tennessee custody cases regarding child rearing
autonomy. 86 To explain the standard for permissible state action to
protect children from a parent's harmful decision, the court used
Tennessee cases where the court ordered medical treatment for children
despite parental objections. 87
The second remarkable step the Hawk court took was to invalidate
the Tennessee grandparent visitation statute as an unconstitutional
intrusion on the Hawk parents' family life, since it permitted the state to
countermand the decisions of fit, married88 parents without requiring a
showing of harm to the child. 89 At least in Tennessee, grandparent
visitation law was the poor stepchild of family law no longer.
In one fell swoop, Hawk legitimized constitutional arguments in the
application of grandparent visitation laws. 90 The Georgia Supreme Court
took the next step in Brooks v. Parkerson/I by finding that Georgia's
open-ended grandparent visitation statute92 was unconstitutional on its
face, under the federal constitution. Relying on United States Supreme
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582.
1d. at 581-82 (discussing In re Robert D., 198 Cal. Rptr. 801, 803-04 (Ct. App. 1984) and
King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1993)).
86/d. at 577-78 (citing State ex reI. Bethell v. Kilvington, 45 S.W. 433, 435 (Tenn. 1898); In
re Knott, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1917)).
87 1d. at 580 (citing Matter of Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)).
88 Although the Tennessee Supreme Court apparently found it material that the Hawk parents
were married, it subsequently repudiated the significance of marriage for a grandparent visitation
analysis. See also, J. C. Bohl, Brave New Statutes: Grandparent Visitation as Unconstitutional
Invasions of Family life and Invalid Exercises of State Power, 3 GEO. MASON U. ClY. RTS. L.J. 271,
276 (1993) (discussing the common law origin of the family as rooted in the union of husband and
wife).
89 Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582.
90 See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995) (extending Hawk's
constitutional principles to a family formed by stepparent adoption); Von EifJ v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d
510 (Fla. 1998) (same).
91 Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
92 See id. at 771. O.C.G.A. Section 19-7-3(c) provides, in pertinent part: "the court may
grant any grandparent of the child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special circumstances
which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child." Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at
771.
84

85
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Court cases, Georgia family law decisions, and the Hawk opinion itself,
the Brooks court held that the state could not impose grandparent
visitation over the parents' objections unless that visitation was
necessary to prevent harm to the child.93
C.

THE PATTERN IS SET: TYPICAL PRE-TROXEL JUDICIAL RESPONSES
TO GRANDPARENT VISITATION SUITS

In the wake of Hawk and Brooks, courts no longer simply dismissed

constitutional arguments. Some courts resolved cases based on best
interests94 or standing,95 and found it unnecessary to address the
constitutional question. Of those courts that did, however, judicial
responses fall into two broad categories.
The first category validated grandparent visitation statutes by
applying the same balancing test originally developed to harmonize
competing constitutional rights in the context of marriage regulation,96
First Amendment rights and abortion cases. This "undue-burden test,,97
is designed to evaluate legislation that effectively places two rights or
interests of constitutional magnitude in conflict. In abortion cases, for
example, a woman's "personal right" to decide whether to have an
abortion conflicts with the state's "important interests" in medical
procedures, and its interest in protecting potential human life. Since each
right necessarily qualifies the other, as long as one does not unduly
burden the other the statute can be evaluated under a lenient, rational
basis review. The undue-burden test thus leads to rational basis review;
rational basis review, in tum, requires only that the statute at issue be
justifiable under some, conceivable circumstance. 98 A grandparent
visitation statute would then survive judicial scrutiny simply because it
was rationally related to any legitimate state goal. 99
The logical flaw with this approach is that, unlike First Amendment
cases or abortion cases, grandparent visitation cases do not include
1d. at 774.
See, e.g., Ward v. Dibble. 683 So.2d 666 (Ha. Ct. App. 1996).
95 See, e.g., Frame v. Nehls. 550 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. 1996).
96 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Califano v. Jobst. 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Joan
C. Bohl. Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation: How Precedent Fell Prey to Sentiment in
Herndon v. Tuhey. 62 Mo. L. REV. 755,778-80 (1997) (discussing Zablocki and Jobst in the context
of grandparent visitation).
97 Justice O'Connor is the primary architect of this concept. See City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled
on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
98 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
99 Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
93
94
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competing interests of constitutional magnitude. Parents certainly have a
constitutionally protected interest in child rearing autonomy, but despite
judicial intimation to the contrary, grandparents have no legal right to
contact with grandchildren. loo Furthermore, although the state, as Parens
Patria, has an interest in child welfare, that interest is only triggered
when parents are unfit. 101 Flawed or not, however, the use of the "undueburden test" in grandparent visitation cases is significant for present
purposes if for no other reason than that it received serious consideration
from the courts of several different jurisdictions. 102 By the time Troxel
was decided, this particular variation of the "undue-burden test" was a
well-established feature on the landscape of grandparent visitation law.
The second category of judicial responses to the constitutional
challenge of a grandparent visitation case recognizes that only one
constitutional right is at stake: the parent's right to childrearing
autonomy. This approach first examines the nature of the right at stake.
Since childrearing autonomy is well established as a fundamental
right,103 the state may only intrude upon it to further a compelling state
interest; a merely legitimate interest will not suffice. Even if the interest
is compelling, the statute will only survive judicial scrutiny if it is
narrowly tailored to further that interest. Cases taking this approach
note that the state's interest is to prevent harm to the child. Although
visitation with a grandparent may sometimes be beneficial, its absence
can hardly be equated to harm as defined in the child welfare context. 104
Further, there is little evidence that grandparent visitation is always of
benefit in the first place. 105 Courts using this fundamental right/strict
scrutiny approach generally invalidate grandparent visitation statutes as
100 See supra note 17. Dissenting Justice Lambert provided an eloquent - if terse statement of
this proposition in King v. King, "The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is its conclusion that a
grandparent has a "fundamental right" to visitation with a grandchild. No authority is cited for this
proposition as there is no such right" King, 828 S.W.2d at 633 (Lambert, 1., dissenting).
101 See, e.g., Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patria: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23
S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971) (tracing the evolution of the concept and discussing its use in juvenile
courts).
102 See, e.g., Ridenour v. Ridenour, 901 P.2d 770 (N.M. Ct App. 1995); R. T. & M. T. v. J.E. &
LE., 650 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. 1994).
103 The litany of U.S. Supreme court decisions cited in support of this proposition includes:
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 158 (1944); Pierce v.
Soc'y o/Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see, e.g., Hawk, 855
S.W.2d at 578; Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 771. Some grandparent visitation cases added to this core
group. See, e.g., Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 578 (adding Moore v. City 0/ E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) to the basic litany).
104 See, e.g., Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580.
105 Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773. Some courts have taken the position that involvement in the
judicial process itself inflicts harm on a child, furthering weakening any compelling state interest
argument See, e.g., McMain v. Iowa Dist. Ct.for Polk County, 559 N.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Iowa 1997).
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unconstitutional.
In 2000, when the United States Supreme Court elected to review a
Washington Supreme Court grandparent visitation decision,106 both
approaches were firmly entrenched in the legal landscape. 107
108

II.

TROXEL V. GRANVILLE

A.

"COUSINS AND MUSIC" 109 THE WASHINGTON SUPERIOR COURT
AWARDS VISITATION

In Washington State, in the late eighties, two daughters were born to
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel: Natalie and Isabelle. IID The girls'
parents - Ms. Granville and Mr. Troxel - never married, and when their
relationship ended in 1991,111 Mr. Troxel moved in with his parents: he
continued to see his daughters regularly at his parents' house. 1I2 In May
of 1993, Mr. Troxel committed suicide. ll3 The children continued
regular visits with their paternal grandparents for a few months after their
father's death.114 In October of 1993, Ms. Granville decided fewer visits
would be better for her daughters, and suggested reduced visitation of
one weekend day per month. I 15 The paternal grandparents declined her
offer and sued, seeking court-ordered visitation that both was more
extensive and included overnight stays.1I6
The pertinent Washington statute provided, in relevant part, that
"any person" could seek court-ordered visitation "at any time" and that it
could be granted whenever "visitation may serve the best interests of the
child.,,117 The Washington Superior Court awarded the grandparents a
full weekend per month, a week in the summer, and additional time on

Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
The Court had denied certiori in a case using a rational basis review and a minimal
intrusion theory, (King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992)), and
in a case applying strict scrutiny (Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 942 (1995)).
108 In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d 698 (Wash Ct. App. 1997), rev'd by 969 P.2d 21
(Wash. 1998); affd sub nom Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
109 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 62.
110 Id. at 60.
III Id.
112
Id.
113 Id .
114
Id.
106

107

Id. at 61.
Id.
117 Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
115

116
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the grandparents' birthdays. liS In support of its decision, the Superior
Court noted that visitation with the grandparents could "provide
opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music.,,119 Ms.
Granville appealed. 120
B.

"ABSURD,,121 ON ITS FACE: THE WASHINGTON COURT OF ApPEALS
REVERSES

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court's
award of visitation and dismissed the case, holding that the grandparents
did not even have standing to sue for two reasons. l22 The Court of
Appeals noted, first, that the statute in question was "absurd,,123 on its
face. It created a means for anyone to seek visitation, with anyone's
child, for reasons that could be frivolous or downright vengeful, but
would nonetheless require the parent to mount an expensive, time
consuming and emotionally draining defense. 124 The legislature, the
court concluded, could not have intended this result. 125
The Court of Appeal's second basis for concluding that the Troxel
grandparents had no standing to seek court-ordered visitation under the
statute arose from its review of the context and history of the statute.
The court noted that the legislature had amended a parallel provision of
Washington law to limit circumstances in which non-parents could seek
court-ordered visitation with children. 126 The court found no "plausible
reason" for the legislature to add a limiting amendment to one provision,
but not to the parallel provision conferring rights on grandparents. 127 The
court thus concluded that the legislature must have intended to limit suits
for grandparent visitation to situations in which the child's custody was
already the subject of a judicial proceeding. 12s The grandparents
appealed. 129

118

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.

119/d.

at 562 (describing the trial court's findings of fact after remand from the court of

appeals).
Id.
121 In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699.
122 Id. at 700.
123
Id.

120

124

Id. at 699.

Id. at 700.
126 Id. (citing Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.10.160(3), 26.10.030(1)).
127 Id. at 700-0 I.
128 Id. at 701.

125

129

In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 24 (Wash. 1998).
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C.

THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN

The Washington Supreme Court took an entirely different view of
the proper construction of the grandparent visitation statute at issue. It
rejected the judicial gloss fashioned by the Court of Appeals, asserting
that when the words of a statute are unambiguous, a court must "assume
[] that the legislature means exactly what it says.,,\30 Since the statute's
terms conferred standing on the petitioning grandparents without any
precondition, that was the proper interpretation. The court held,
however, that the effect of the statute was to "impermissibly interfere
with a parent's fundamental interest in the care, custody and
companionship of the child. 131 Thus, the court invalidated the statute on
federal constitutional grounds. 132
First, the court established the fundamental nature of the right at
stake, as developed through United States Supreme Court precedent. It
emphasized that the right to family integrity was specifically protected
by the federal constitution through the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth and the Ninth Amendments. 133 The court also
linked the right to family integrity to the "privacy rights inherent in the
[United States] Constitution." Since the right to decide with whom one's
child will associate is a fundamental right, state action infringing upon it
must serve a compelling state interest. 134
Thus, the state can only "intrude upon a family's integrity ... when
'parental actions or decisions seriously conflict with the physical or
mental health of the child.",135
The statute at issue, however,
incorporated no such threshold. The court observed that when a child
has a "substantial relationship" with a non-parent, arbitrarily depriving
the child of contact with that person would harm the child. 136 At a
minimum, then, in order to pass constitutional muster, the statute must
include a threshold requirement of a substantial relationship between the
petitioning grandparent and the child. 137 Since it did not, it was
unconstitutional on its face under the federal constitution. 138
130
\3\
\32

\33
\34
\35

\36
\37

Id. at 25.
/d. at 3l.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29 (citing In re Sumey, 621 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1980).
Id.
Id.

\38 Facial invalidation of a statute means that it is unconstitutional no matter how it is applied.
In contrast, invalidating a statute "as applied," strikes down the statute only as it was applied in the
individual case before the court; the statute itself remains intact. For further discussion see Richard
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When the United States Supreme Court granted the Troxel
grandparents' petition for certiorari,139 the decision it agreed to review
was a detailed articulation of a fundamental rights/strict scrutiny analysis
which incorporated a specific discussion of how the harm standard could
l40
have been applied.
The Washington Supreme Court decision was not
complicated by any references to independent state constitutional
grounds; 141 if the decision were not drafted as a challenge to the high
court, it could have been.
D.

"UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS ApPLIED": THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
PLURALITY

The United States Supreme Court's plurality decision 142 did, in fact,
affirm the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 143 The Supreme
Court's first step, however, was to recast the question before it. The
Washington Supreme Court had taken the position that the state's
grandparent visitation statute was facially unconstitutional; 144 the United
States Supreme Court, however, stated that it would "decide whether [the
statute] as applied to Tommie Granville and her family violates the
Federal Constitution.,,145 This had the practical effect of making the
Court's holding fact specific. With the question recast in this manner,
the Court did not have to address the Washington Supreme Court's
position that any grandparent visitation statute was an improper exercise
of state power unless it incorporated a harm standard. Consequently,
despite the narrow reach of the plurality decision, four aspects of the
decision had enormous practical significance for state courts deciding
grandparent visitation cases.
First, the Court held that the interest at issue was "[t]he liberty
interest ... of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children ..
H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REv.
1321, 1323 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235, 237-38 (1994).
139 Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
140 In re Smith, 969 P.2d at 30-31.
141 Reliance on state constitutional provisions would place a state court's holding beyond the
reach of further appellate review by the U.S. Supreme Court because the highest court of any state is
the final arbiter of that state's constitutional question. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041
(1983); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
142 Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Ginsberg
and Justice Breyer. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59.
143 Id. at 75.
144 In re Smith, 969 P.2d at 28-30 (holding that the federal constitution pennits state
interference with parental rights only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child).
145 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
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,,146 The Court noted that parents are presumed to act in the best
interests of their children, and that our legal concept of family rests on
this presumption. 147 This holding is important to grandparent visitation
law because it establishes once and for all that the right of family privacy
applies in the context of grandparent visitation. Some pre-Troxel cases
had taken the position that a grandparent visitation order was too minor
an intrusion to implicate the parents' liberty interest at all. Others had
recognized some right of parental autonomy, but had found it minimal
and had concluded that it could be counterbalanced by general state
interests in a minor's well being. Troxel's holding on this point ended a
longstanding debate and legitimized constitutional arguments in
grandparent visitation suits.
Second, the Court held that given a parent's liberty interest in
childrearing, the state will "normally" have no reason to question
parental decisions. 148 The Court did not define the word "normally,"
however. If "normally" simply referred to parental fitness, unmarred by
any temporary and potentially harmful lapse in parental judgment, then it
would fit neatly into the fundamental right/strict scrutiny analysis of the
Washington Supreme Court, and of many of the grandparent visitation
cases that preceded it. 149 In context, however, "normally" cannot simply
refer to parental fitness. The Court is emphatic that its decision does not
rest on a fit parent's "normal" right to be free of state intervention in
parenting decisions,150 but instead rests on the "combination of . . .
factors,,151 it finds in the case.152
Third, the Court introduced a "special-weight" requirement; it held
that the problem l53 is not that the Washington Superior Court ordered
visitation, but that the court failed to give "at least some special
weight,,154 to Mrs. Granville's "determination of her daughters' best
interests.,,155 The Court first noted that Mrs. Granville actually consented
to some grandparent visitation; she simply proposed less visitation, and
146

[d.

147

[d. at 68.
[d. at 69.

148

See, e.g., Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 753.
"We do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington
Supreme Court - whether the Due Process Clause requires all non-parental visitation statutes to
include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting
visitation." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 74.
151 [d. at 68.
152 [d. at 72.
153 [d. at 69.
154 [d. at 70 (emphasis added).
155 [d. at 69.
149

150
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sought a different schedule. 156 The Court stated, disapprovingly, that
instead of deferring to her wishes the trial justice simply imposed a
visitation schedule of his own. 157 In the same paragraph, the Court
observed approvingly that some grandparent visitation statutes l58 contain
limiting language that requires a grandparent to allege that the parents
have denied access to the grandchild as a precondition to filing suit. 159
The connection seems to be that "special weight" could be interpreted as
a legal standard or as a factual determination. Either the statute must
specifically defer to a parent's wishes in some way or a court must defer,
on a factual level, to the terms of a parent's offer. The fact that the
parent offers some visitation thus becomes significant to the analysis.
This is not only contrary to the approach taken by the Washington
Supreme Court, but also to other jurisdictions' pre-Troxel analyses of the
familial interests at stake. The Washington Supreme Court took the
position that grandparent visitation could properly be awarded over the
objections of a fit parent when the parent arbitrarily deprived the child of
contact with the grandparent after a close relationship had been
established. 160 The parent's cooperation - or lack of it - would not factor
into this analysis; the focus is simply on whether a substantial
relationship exists between a grandparent and grandchild.
Other pre-Troxel decisions agree. In Roberts v. Ward, 161 for
example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that court-ordered
grandparent visitation was an appropriate exercise of parens patriae
power where the child and grandparent had formed "close personal
attachments.,,162 In the more recent case of O'Brien v. O'Brien, the same
court found that although the petitioning grandfather satisfied the
statute's standing requirement, his petition was insufficient because it
"d[id] not even allege that [the grandfather] has ever had any contact,
meaningful or otherwise, with the child he now seeks to visit.,,163 Unlike
Troxel's mandate to give special weight to the parent's willingness to
allow some visitation, this approach would have given special weight to
the existence of a relationship between grandparent and grandchild,
regardless of whether the parent wanted any visitation to occur or not.
The fourth aspect of Troxel that has practical significance for
[d.
[d.
158 [d.
159 [d.

at 71.
at 69.
at 70.
at 71-72.
160 [n re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28 (Wash. 1998).
161 Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1985).
162 [d. at 481.
163 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 684 A.2d 1352 (N.H. 1996).
156
157
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grandparent visitation law is the Court's disapproving comment on the
effect of a grandparent visitation suit itself. The Court concluded that it
is unnecessary to remand the case for further proceedings; the challenged
order was clearly unconstitutional and the cost and disruption of
additional litigation would "further burden Granville's parental right."I64
This general point had certainly been made in other pre-Troxel cases. In
Brooks v. Parkerson,165 for example, the Georgia Supreme Court noted
that "the impact of a lawsuit to enforce [visitation] over the parents'
objection can only have a deleterious effect on the child. 166 The Iowa
Supreme court vacated an award of grandparent visitation while noting,
in dicta, "the adverse effect [on children] of litigation to enforce
visitation.,,167 Child welfare experts and legal commentators had also
pointed out the emotional injuries potentially flowing from the suit
itself. 168 Prior to Troxel, however, the point seemed often lost in
unrealistic and sentimental generalizations about grandparents 169 and in

164 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. Since it had decided that the challenged statute could not be
constitutionally applied to the defendant mother, the plurality apparently concluded nothing
remained to be decided. Id.
165 Brooks, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
166 /d. at 773.

McMain v. Iowa, 559 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1997).
See, e.g., Ross A. Thompson, et aI., Grandparents' Visitation Rights: Legalizing the Ties
that Bind, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1220 (1989); JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL, BEYOND THE
BEST iNTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (Free Press, 1979); J. C. Bohl, Brave New Statutes: Grandparent
Visitation Statutes as Unconstitutional Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State
Power, 3 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.1. 271, 296-98 (1993); Sharon F. Ladd, Note, Tennessee
Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents and the Best Interest of the Child, 15 MEM. ST. V.L.
REV. 635, 652 (1985). In Congressional hearings on grandparent visitation, Dr. Andre Derdeyne, a
child psychiatrist, testified that with all his experience he could not identify characteristics which
distinguish grandparents with a genuine interest in their grandchildren from those who, when their
child divorced, became "completely caught up in attacking their child's former spouse or even
attacking their own child with grave consequences for their grandchildren." Grandparents: The
Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services
of the House of Representatives Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess, 77 (1982) (statement
of Dr. Andre Derdeyne, Professor of Psychiatry, Director, Division of Child and Family Psychiatry,
University of Virginia School of Medicine).
169 See, e.g., Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Mo. 1993); Beckman v. Boggs, 655
A.2d 901, 909 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) ('''[Ilt is fundamentally in the best interests of any child to have
contacts with his or her grandparents''') (quoting trial court with approval) (citation omitted); King v.
King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992), cen. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992) ("That grandparents and
grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from contact with the
other. The child can learn respect, a sense of responsibility and love"). The fallacy of the
assumption has been noted by other judges. See, e.g., id. at 635 (Lambert, 1., dissenting) ("[The
majority] makes the per se assumption that deprivation of access to the grandparent is harm. There
is no authority for this proposition and it is otherwise illogical"); Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581 ("[W]e
also seek to avoid the 'unquestioning judicial assumption' that grandparent-grandchild relationships
always benefit children .... ") (citation omitted).
167

168
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legislators' rush to expand grandparents' statutory rights to visitation. 170
Troxel's condemnation of the effects of a grandparent visitation suit
on parents and children thus definitively established a point that had been
- alternately - raised, disputed or ignored. By so doing, Troxel may have
the general effect of discouraging future expansion of grandparent
statutes, or of reining in expansive interpretations of existing statutory
rights in the courts. Troxel's recognition of this harm has already
influenced one post-Troxel case in California: since grandparent
visitation litigation burdens parental rights, any attempt to give special
weight to a parent's decision must not only require deference to it, but
must also compensate for the burden that litigation imposes. l7l
III. THE CALIFORNIA COURTS' RESPONSE TO TROXEL

Three California statutes provide grandparents with standing to seek
court-ordered visitation with grandchildren.172 The first, California
Family Code Section 3102, applies to all "close relatives" of the child
when one of the child's parents is dead. It directs the court to "consider"
the amount of personal contact between the plaintiff and the child, unless
the plaintiff is a grandparent. 173 If the plaintiff is a grandparent, then the
court's decision rests solely on the best interests of the child; the court
does not evaluate the amount of personal contact between grandparents
and grandchildren. Opposition from the parent, if any, does not figure in
the statutory framework at all.
The second provision, Family Code Section 3103, confers standing
on the grandparent to seek court ordered visitation when the child's
parents are divorcing or are involved in a similar proceeding. Under this
provision, if the parents are united in their opposition to grandparent
visitation, that opposition creates "a rebuttable presumption affecting the
burden of proof' that grandparent visitation is not in the best interests of
the child. 174
The final provision, Family Code Section 3104, includes additional
circumstances giving grandparents standing to sue, plus guidelines for a
grandparent visitation award. The court is required to support an award
of visitation with a finding that an emotional bond existed between
grandparent and grandchild prior to suit "such that visitation is in the best

See supra note 4.
Butler ll, 96 P.3d 141,169 (Cal. 2004) (Brown, J. concurring and dissenting).
172 Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3102, 3103, 3104 (Deering 1994).
173 1d. § 3102 (b) (Deering 1994).
174 Id.§ 3103(d) (Deering 1994).
170
171
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interests of the child.,,175 The court must also balance the child's interest
in visitation against the parents' right to exercise their parental
authority.176 Section 3104 prohibits a suit for grandparent visitation if
the natural or adoptive parents are married, unless some sort of non-legal
disruption of the relationship has taken place. 177 This Section also
protects parents with a rebuttable presumption in favor of their wishes.
If both parents agree that visitation is not in the best interests of the child,
that opposition raises a rebuttable presumption in deference to the
parents' decisions. 178 An identical presumption protects the decision of a
parent with sole custody. 179
In California, as in other jurisdictions, Troxel's holding that forced
grandparent visitation implicates the parent's right to childrearing
autonomy sparked analysis of the constitutionality of the state's
statutes. 180 Courts reviewing the constitutionality of these statutes
commented, however, that the California statutes lacked the
"breathtaking" breadth of the statute at issue in Troxel,181 or avoided a
facial analysis entirely, and focused on the constitutionality of the statute
as applied. 182
The question of how to implement Troxel's "special-weight"
requirement has been the central problem for California courts hearing
grandparent visitation cases in a post-Troxel world. The most direct way
to implement it is simply to defer to the parent's wishes where the parent
- like the mother in Troxel - offers some visitation. This is exactly what
several Court of Appeals justices did. In Kyle O. v. Donald R.,183 for
example, a widowed father argued that, although he wanted his daughter
to have contact with her maternal grandparents, he wanted visits to occur
spontaneously, as they did with his parents. 184
The maternal
Id.§ 3104(a) (I) (Deering 1994).
Id.§ 3104(a) (2) (Deering 1994).
177 Id.§ 3104 (b)(l)-(4) (Deering 1994).
The statute presumably contemplates informal
separation, although its parameters have not been established by case law. See id.
178 Id. § 3104(e) (Deering 1994).
179 Id. § 3104(f) (Deering 1994).
180 See, e.g., Lopez v. Martinez, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Although appellant
did not challenge the constitutionality of section 3104, we find a brief constitutional analysis of the
statute is merited in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent consideration of the issue of
grandparent visitation statutes in Troxel v. Granville . .. "). For two diametrically opposed examples
of the responses to Troxel from other jurisdictions see In re G.P.e. 28 S.W.3d 357 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000) and Howard v. Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003).
181 Lopez, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77.
182 See, e.g., Zasueta v. Zasueta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245, 253 (Ct. App. 2002); Punsly v. Ho,
105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 147 (Ct. App. 2001); Kyle O. v. Donald R., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 486 (2000).
183 Kyle A., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476.
184 Id. at 483.
175

176
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grandparents argued that the father was so hostile he might not promote
regular visitation; the court vacated the standing visitation order,
nevertheless. It observed, first, that the father's preferences must be
honored. 185 Second, the court opined that hostilities might lessen without
the negative effects of ongoing litigation - an implicit nod to Troxel's
comment on of the effect of grandparent visitation litigation itself. 186
Similarly, in Punsly v. HO,187 a widowed mother proposed a limited
schedule of visitation both before and after the grandparents petitioned
for court ordered visitation. 188 Despite her offers, the trial court ordered
a different and more extensive schedule of visitation;189 the mother
appealed. 190 On appeal, the mother argued that since she, like the mother
in Troxel, had offered some visitation, her offer was entitled to special
weight. The grandparents disagreed, arguing that Troxel's deference to a
parent's proposals should not apply because, although the mother had
proposed some visitation, she had also cut off all visitation for a period
of five months. 191 Rejecting the grandparents' argument, the Court of
Appeals held that the details of the mother's proposed visitation were
irrelevant. Troxel applied; the controlling consideration was that the
mother had, in fact, proposed visitation, and had acknowledged the value
of some contact with the grandparents. 192 Her wishes, like those of the
mother in Troxel, were thus entitled to special weight. Given this
conclusion, the Court of Appeals could have either refused to order any
visitation at all or ordered exactly what the mother herself had proposed.
Both options would have been consistent with Troxel. It elected to take
the former, and dismissed the case. 193
For the California Appellate Courts, giving special weight to
parental decision-making by either ordering what the parent proposed or
simply dismissing the case and making visitation voluntary was legally
unassailable, where the case to be decided was factually similar to
Troxel. The drawback, of course, was that when cases arose that did not
involve the wishes of a single, accommodating parent, the simple factual
analogies supporting the decisions in Kyle O. and Punsly provided no
at 487.
1d.
187 Punsiy, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139.
188 The grandparents sued the mother pursuant to California Family Code Section 3102, and
Punsiy v. Ho, (lOS Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141). This provision does not provide a statutory presumption
against visitation if a parent is opposed to it. grandparent visitation. Cal. Fam. Code § 3102.
189 Punsiy, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 141.
190 1d. at 140-41.
191 Id. at 145.
192
1d.
185/d.
186

193

1d. at 147.
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logical guidance. Thus, in cases where the facts were dissimilar to
Troxel, the California courts were forced to examine the logic behind
Troxel's 'special-weight' requirement. The primary case detailing this
. . IS
. Za sueta V. Za sueta. 194
exammatIOn
In Zasueta, a widowed mother opposed all visitation with her
child's paternal grandparents;195 the trial court nevertheless awarded
visitation. 196 Vacating this award, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court violated Troxel's mandate to give special weight to a parent's
decision. 197 Even though the mother had opposed all visitation, the court
was nevertheless required to give weight to her preference. 198 Instead,
the trial court discounted her objections, announcing, for example, that
the mother's objections to the grandparents' use of alcohol must be taken
"with a grain of salt.,,199 When the mother's attorney argued that it was a
matter of a parent's choice, the trial justice stated: "this court is going to
make a choice."20o The Court of Appeals held that the trial justice had
thus improperly substituted his own judgment for the mother's
judgment,201 making his own preferences "weightier."
The Court of Appeals also rejected the grandparents' contention that
the mother's opposition to any visitation distinguished her circumstances
from the circumstances reviewed in Troxel. 202 The grandparents'
position would "mean that, whenever a parent expresses opposition to
grandparent visitation this opposition should automatically be considered
a factor in favor of visitation." As the court noted, this would contradict
Troxel's "central holding" that parental decision-making should be
respected,z°3 After Kyle 0., Punsly, and Zasueta, then, the specialweight requirement had evolved: it no longer depended on the parent's
willingness to allow visitation. Instead, "special weight" simply required
deference to parental wishes and objections.
The Appellate Court was forced to further clarify the legal
significance of a parent's visitation decision, and of a parent's proposed
schedule of visitation, in Fenn v. Sherriff.204 In Fenn, the widowed father
Zasueta v. Zasueta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 eCt. App. 2(02).
at 247.
196 [d. at 249.
197 [d. at 254.
198 [d. at 254-55.
199 [d. at 248.
200 [d.
194

195/d.

201

[d. at 255.

202

[d. at 254-55.
[d. at 254.

203

204 Fenn v. Sherriff, I Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 eCt. App. 2003). In Sherriff, the court's focus was on
the propriety of a motion for summary judgment. [d. at 196. The children's father and adoptive
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offered the maternal grandparents such a limited visitation schedule that
they actually saw their grandchildren for only one hour every two and a
half months. 205 The father required the grandparents to pay for a third
party's services to supervise the visitation, so that the grandparents ended
up paying approximately $6.00 for each minute of time they spent with
the children. 206 Furthermore, the father prohibited the grandparents from
giving gifts to the children, or taking pictures with them. 207 Reviewing
these particulars, the court observed that failure to give special weight to
such grudging and minimal visitation should have no constitutional
significance?08 The court stated that a "meaningful" offer of visitation or presumably a meaningful rejection of visitation - deserves
deference,209 and the father's offer was not "meaningful." The essence
of the ruling seems to be that the father's harsh limits were not
reasonable because they did not correspond to the children's needs.
Nothing in the record suggested that third party supervision was
necessary or that the children were camera-phobic. 2IO
Unlike the limits on visitation sought by the parents in Troxel,211
Kyle 0.,212 or Punsly,2l3 the limits Mr. Sherriff sought to impose on the
maternal grandparents seem merely to express hostility. Thus, where a
parent's proposed limitations on - or rejection of - visitation promote
some stated childrearing goal, that parental decision deserves "special
weight.,,214 Where the parent's decision does not further any childrearing
goal, however, that decision cannot be considered the exercise of
recognized parental authority that Troxel sought to protect.
Basing grandparent visitation decisions on factual comparisons with

mother had successfully moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the grandparent's
petition for visitation was legally insufficient absent an allegation of parental unfitness. [d. at 197.
The appellate court disagreed, holding that Troxel's special-weight requirement did not necessarily
preclude the trial court from awarding visitation over the objections of fit parents, making summary
judgment improper. [d. at 198.
205 [d. at 199.
206

[d.

207

[d.

208/d.

209 [d.

Nothing in the opinion suggests otherwise.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (mother seeking visitation that did not require the children to be
away from home overnight).
212 Kyle 0., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487 (father seeking visitation that would not interfere with
"his quality parenting time ... on the weekends" or with the child's "extracurricular activities").
213 Punsly, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145 (mother seeking visitation that would distribute the
burden of travel more evenly between her and the grandparents).
214 Troxel, 530 U.S. 69; see supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of
"special weight."
210

211
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Troxel is obviously a strategy of limited usefulness, even when a court,
as in Zasueta, uses logic to extend the comparison to new factual
circumstances. If the "special-weight" requirement simply meant that a
court had to rubber stamp legitimate parental decisions, then the Troxel
plurality would at least have required strict scrutiny of grandparent
visitation statutes - and perhaps invalidated them altogether. 215 Instead,
"special weight" must involve balancing the parent's decision - no
matter what it is - against the grandparent visitation statute's goal, while
tipping the scales in favor of the parent. In an attempt to strike this
balance, California courts began framing the special-weight inquiry in
terms of whether the trial court had applied a presumption in favor of
parental decision-making.
The fact that California's grandparent visitation statutes create a
rebuttable presumption against visitation when the parents oppose it had
not prompted any judicial discussion prior to Troxel. After Troxel,
however, these presumptions became a vehicle for giving parental
decisions special weight in the equation of a grandparent visitation
SUit. 216 Insofar as they were interpreted to do so, these presumptions
created a federal constitutional mandate as well as a statutory obligation
to follow the parent's wishes.
Some California courts held that this statutory presumption was
sufficient to give parental decisions the special weight Troxel required
without any judicial gloss.217 As written, the presumption required
grandparents to produce enough evidence that court-ordered grandparent
visitation is in the best interest of the child to overcome any objection by
the parents. In theory, at least, the presumption means that the parents'
objection controls; they do not need to prove the basis for their
objections. To overcome the presumption, the grandparents must
provide more evidence favoring visitation under a best interests of the
child analysis 218 than the parents can muster opposing it. If the
grandparents fail to meet this evidentiary burden, but the trial judge
nevertheless rules in their favor, the trial judge is elevating his or her
215 This was essentially Justice Thomas' pOSItIon: "I would apply strict scrutiny to
infringements of fundamental rights [such as court-ordered grandparent visitation). ld. at 80
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Here, the State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental
interest - to say nothing of a compelling one - in second guessing a fit parent's decision regarding
visitation with thirds parties." ld.
216 See, e.g., Fenn, I Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195 n.4.
217 See, e.g., Lopez, 102 Cal. Rpt. 2d at 77.
218 This is an important qualification. Although grandparent visitation statutes may, in reality
respond to grandparents' interests, (Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1083-84 (Mass. 2002) (Sosman,
J. dissenting», the focus of any proper inquiry is on the child's needs. See, e.g., Butler II, 96 P.3d at
141 (noting that the grandparents' extensive efforts to locate the child were legally irrelevant).
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conclusions over the parents' in violation of the statute. The statutory
presumption would certainly prevent a judge from simply substituting his
or her judgment for that of the parents and so - in the opinion of some
California courts - confer the required proof on parents' decisions. Since
none of the statutes specify the burden of proof necessary to overcome
the presumption, however, California law requires only a preponderance
of the evidence. 219 The parents' decision can be overcome by a very
small quantum of evidence indeed.
In Butler v. Harris, the Court of Appeals questioned whether the
statutory presumption, as written, could satisfy the special-weight
requirement given the constitutional significance of parental decisionmaking. Since Troxel forbids the state from infringing "on the
fundamental rights of parents to make childrearing decisions simply
because a state judge believes a better decision could be made," the
preponderance of the evidence standards must be insufficient protection
for parental rights.z2o A "better" decision correlates to evidence only
slightly stronger than what the parent has presented; it gives, at best
some weight not special weight to the parent's decision. Giving the
parents only a slight advantage in the decision-making process allocates
the risk of an erroneous decision almost equally between the parents and
the grandparents. 221 Since Troxel recognized that the parental right
implicated in grandparent visitation cases is a fundamental right, the
constitution requires a more significant quantum of proof than mere
preponderance to correctly allocate the risk of an erroneous decision. 222
Reasoning thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that the grandparent
visitation statutes were constitutional under the California Constitution
if, and only if, the rebuttable presumptions designed to protect parental
decision-making were interpreted to require a grandparent to rebut the
parental decision with clear and convincing evidence.223
Reviewing this decision, a majority of the California Supreme Court
agreed that by statute, the grandparents were required to overcome a
statutory presumption that visitation is not in the best interest of the
child. 224 Therefore, when a trial justice simply concludes that visitation
219 The preponderance standard is generally accepted in civil actions where, for example,
monetary damages are at stake. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters (In re Marriage of Peters), 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d 493, 494 (Ct. App. 1997); lillian F. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606 (Ct. App. 1984).
220 Butler v. Harris (In re Marriage of Harris), 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 142 (Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73), affd in part and remanded by 96 P.3d 141 (2004) [hereafter
Butler 1].
221 [d. at 141.
222 [d. (citing Peters, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494).
223 [d. at 142.
224 Butler II, 96 P.3d at 154.
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is in the best interests of the child, he has not applied the statutory
presumption. The majority did not, however, address the Court of
Appeals' position that the presumption could only be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence.
Two dissenting justices did agree with the Court of Appeals,
however, and expanded on its 10gic.225 California Evidence Code
Section 606 explains that the effect of a presumption like that provided
for in Family Code Section 3104 is to require the party against whom it
operates - here, the grandparents - to prove the nonexistence of the
presumed fact. 226 Since parents oppose visitation, grandparents must
disprove "the presumed fact" that visitation is contrary to the best
interests of the child. 227 The comment to Evidence Code Section 606
explains that, absent a contrary interpretation, this requires only proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. Despite the "formidable" ring to
Famil y Code Section 3104' s presumption, then, it requires nothing that
the grandparents would not have done anyway228 and, in fact, no more
than would be required in a typical civil suit over money.229
As a practical matter, to overcome parental objections under a clear
and convincing standard the grandparents must marshal more than the
prospect of an array of pleasant experiences for the children they seek to
visit. 230 In Butler, both the Appellate COurt231 and the dissenting justices
on the California Supreme Court232 observed that grandparents would
have to prove that lack of visitation would cause detriment to the child.
As Justice Chinn stated, "[i]n most cases, ... grandparents would be
successful in overcoming the presumption if they could "show that denial
of visitation would result in some kind of harm or potential harm to the
child.,,233 The Troxel plurality had explicitly avoided endorsing the harm
standard234 that the Washington Supreme Court had espoused235 and that
so many jurisdictions had used. Yet application of the basic principles
underlying the Troxel decision had led the California courts to the brink
of such a position in less than five years. After Butler, it is at least

225
226
227

Id. at 164-68 (Chinn, 1., dissenting); Id. at 169-70 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id. at 165 (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 606).
Id.

228/d.

Peters, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
Butler II, 96 P.3d at 169 n.7.
231 Butler I, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at l39-40.
232 Butler II, 96 P. 3d at 170 (Brown, J. dissenting).
233 Butler II, 96 P.3d at 169 n.7 (Chin, J., dissenting).
234 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
235 Id. at 63 (citing In re: Smith, 969 P.2d at 28-30).
229

230
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arguable that Troxel's "special-weight" requirement prevents the award
of grandparent visitation in California unless the grandparent can show
by clear and convincing evidence that the child would suffer a detriment
without the visitation.
The California courts also broke no new ground in their approach to
the problem of apportioning special weight to parental decision-making
when two parents disagreed on issues of grandparent visitation. In
Butler, the only post-Troxel case to present the issue squarely, the
parents divorced after a brief marriage. 236 The mother was granted sole
legal and physical custody of the only child of the marriage, Emily.237
The father was awarded limited, supervised visitation contingent on his
participation in various therapeutic programs. 238
The paternal
grandparents were awarded court-ordered visitation,239 and years of
litigation ensued, with the terms of the visitation in constant dispute. 24o
When Emily was about five and living with her mother and adoptive
father in Utah,241 her biological father joined the paternal grandparents'
motion to expand visitation. 242 The California trial court awarded the
grandparents visitation totaling more than three weeks; Emily would be
required to fly, unaccompanied, from Utah to California. 243 The mother
appealed.
The California Court of Appeals ruled, inter alia, that the
grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to the
mother. 244 The mother's opposition had not been given special weight in
the trial court;245 indeed, the trial court had discounted the mother's
objections and substituted its own for hers. 246 The Court of Appeals
decision does not address the fact that the biological father had joined the
petition. In fact, the assumption underlying the decision is that the "fit
custodial parent['s]" decision controls, and the non-custodial parent's
views are irrelevant.
The Court of Appeals thus approached the allocation of special
weight as the Tennessee Supreme Court might have more than a decade
Butler 11,96 P.3d at 143.
[d. at 144.
238 [d.
236

237

239

[d. at 144-46.

240
241

[d. at 144.
[d.

242

[d. at 145.

243 The mother appealed and the ruling became the focus, first, of a Court of Appeals decision
and then of a decision of the California Supreme Court. [d.
244 Butler [,112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130 (citation omitted).
245 [d. at 143.
246 [d. at 133, 143.
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earlier, had it been required to do so in Hawk v. Hawk. 247 Both the Court
of Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court approached the issue of
parental decision-making in grandparent visitation cases by examining
the issue in other family law decisions. 248 The California courts "are
reluctant to interfere in family matters," the Court of Appeals observed,
"absent a compelling need" to do so. Like the Tennessee Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals determined that the concept of "compelling
need" must be given the accepted definition developed in abuse and
neglect cases. The state has a compelling need to intervene in parental
decision-making only when the parent provides less than adequate
care. 249 The mother's visitation decision created no such threat of harm
to Emily's well being; the Court of Appeals held that it was therefore
entitled to deference.
On appeal, a slim majority of the California Supreme Court ignored
both California decisional law and the out-of-state precedent the
appellant mother had cited, reversing the Court of Appeals in a poorly
supported decision25o reminiscent of an earlier generation of grandparent
visitation decisions. 251 Without discussing any of the California cases
upon which the Court of Appeals had relied, the majority commented
that no California authority was directly on point. It then held that the
father's support for the grandparents' motion negated any constitutional
protection to which the mother's decision would otherwise be due.252
Three dissenting justices253 rejected the majority's conclusion
regarding the significance of parental disagreement regarding visitation
and, like the Court of Appeals, related their conclusions to other
California family law decisions and to out-of-state precedent. 254 Justice
Chinn noted that, under California law, the fact that the mother had both
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (discussed supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text).
See, e.g., id. at 577-78; Butler 1,112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
249 Butler I, 112 Cal Rptr 2d at 143.
250 Note, California Supreme Court Finds No Infringement of Custodial Mother's Due
Process Parenting Interest When Noncustodial Father Supports Grandparent Visitation Petition. Butlerv. Harris (In re: Marriage of Harris), 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004),118 HARv. L. REV. 1046,1051
(2005) (noting, inter alia, that the California Supreme Court Majority's opinion "can survive only a
cursory reading of TroxeC'); Butler II, 96 P.3d 141, 163-64 (Cal. 2(04) (Chinn, J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority's conclusion on this point is "as troubling as it is unprecedented" and would
remove any "constitutional constraint on the state's power to step in and override the custodial
parent's decision" when "a third party's visitation request is supported by a noncustodial parent").
251 See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
252 Butler 1/,96 P.3d at 152.
253 Justices Baxter, Chinn and Brown each filed a separate opinion concurring and dissenting.
Id. ar 154 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting), 163 (Chinn, J., concurring and dissenting), 169
(Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
254 See, e.g., id.
247

248
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sole legal and sole physical custody meant that she had the "exclusive
'right and responsibility to make the decisions relating to' [her
daughter's] 'health, education, and welfare. ",255 Even if custodial rights
had not been fully vested in the mother, Justice Chinn notes, precedent
from both California and other jurisdictions establishes that the decisions
of divorced parents, without regard to a custody order, are entitled to as
much protection as those of any other parents?56 Since each parent's
childrearing decision is entitled to respect, the court will not
countermand one parent's decision at the behest of the other, absent a
danger of harm to the child.257
Not only did the majority allow parental disagreement to negate
parental rights, it compounded this analytical error by remanding the
case to the trial court with instructions to apply the statutory
presumption. By doing this, the majority implicitly rejected the idea that
the statutory presumption was constitutionally significant. When the
majority concluded that neither parent retained constitutionally protected
rights to make childrearing decisions given the other parent's opposition,
the presumption became a meaningless formality. With the statutory
presumption no longer a vehicle for protecting parental rights, the
majority had unwittingly called the entire statutory scheme into question,
given Troxel's special-weight requirement. As Justice Chinn observed, a
majority of the California Supreme Court was willing to give a trial court
carte blanche to order visitation whenever one parent argues to it,
however capricious or poorly reasoned the argument may be?58 This can
hardly be squared with Troxel's mandate.
IV. CONCLUSION

If the Troxel plurality introduced the concept of "special weight" in
order to create a lesser standard of scrutiny and so avoid giving official
imprimatur to the harm standard,259 five years of California grandparent

255 See e.g., id. at 161 (Chinn, 1., dissenting) (citing Cal. Fam. Code § 3006 (West 2003».
Justice Chinn notes that by stipulating to this allocation of parental responsibility the father
relinquished his right "to have any legal say in most of the decisions regarding Emily's upbringing,"
(id.), including with whom she would associate. [d.
256 [d. at 163. Justice Chinn notes "that caselaw in California reflects a salutary judicial
disinclination to interfere with family privacy without the evidentiary establishment of compelling
need .... The rationale that supports judicial respect for family privacy does not lose its force upon
the dissolution of the marriage." [d. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
257 [d.

[d. at 163-64 (Chinn, 1., dissenting).
See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Who Gets the Children? Parental Rights After Troxel v.
Granville: Constitutional Pragmatism/or a changing American Family, 32 RUTGERS LJ. 711, 714
258
259
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visitation decisions suggest it was unsuccessful. Since Troxel provided
no guidance on when a parent's visitation decision could be
countermanded, the only answer lay in the judicial tradition of family
privacy - which in fact, Troxel expressly affirmed. 260 This tradition
taught that a parent's decision cannot be honored when it would cause
the child harm. 261 In the visitation context, a child is harmed when an
established relationship is suddenly disrupted?62 Using this reasoning,
many California courts interpreted Troxel's special-weight requirement
as consistent with the better reasoned majority of pre-Troxel grandparent
visitation cases, and so applied strict scrutiny, either explicitll63 or
implicitly.264 Regardless of how Troxel cast the issue, these courts
appeared willing to intrude on parental decision-making only when the
child would be harmed.
The California Supreme Court majority's approach to apportioning
that special-weight requirement between warring parents, on the other
hand, lacks any such logic, and is consistent only with discredited
distinctions in parental rights based on family configuration rather than
fitness?65 For present purposes, it is crucial to note, however, that the
flawed decision in Butler is not different from flawed decisions that
preceded Troxel, and was not the result of Troxel in any respect. The
Troxel plurality itself often refers to parental rights in the singular: "so
long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children ... there will
normally be no reason for the state to. . .question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's
(2001); Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v Granville, 2000 SUP. CT.
REv. 279, 303 (2001).
260 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (citing, inter alia, Stanley v. lll., 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y oj Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).
261 Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) Pierce
v. Soc'y ojSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
262 Troxel itself acknowledges this, in dicta, while hypothesizing about the origins of
grandparent visitation statutes. [d., 530 U.S. at 64.
263 Butler I, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 140 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the grandparent
visitation provision at issue is constitutional "provided [it] is read to require clear and convincing
evidence that the child will suffer harm if visitation is not ordered").
264 See, e.g., Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 147 (Ct. App. 2001) ( holding that a
visitation order must be vacated because it "unduly infringed on [the mother's] fundamental
parenting rights" given that she was a fit mother, willing to voluntarily schedule some visitation);
Kyle O. v. Donald R., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 486 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that "[b]ecause the trial
court did not make any finding that Kyle was an unfit parent, Kyle is entitled to a presumption that
he will act in his child's best interests, and his decision regarding ... visitation ... must be given
deference").
265 A particularly compelling discussion of the legal and logical flaws of this approach can be
found in Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E. 2d 1052, 1075-76 (Mass. 2002) (Sosman, J., dissenting).
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children.,,266 This implies that a constitutionally protected right is vested
in each parent. In Butler, the California Supreme Court majority does
make superficial references to Troxel. 267 In fact, however its conclusions
regarding special weight are inconsistent with Troxel's central theme of
deference to parental decision-making. 268
Post-Troxel grandparent visitation law as glimpsed through the
window of five years of California decisions is thus not radically
different from pre-Troxel grandparent visitation law, both at its best and
at its worst. But if Troxel's language was not sufficiently assertive to
eliminate flawed decisions like the California Supreme Court majority in
Butler, it did address the wrong that grandparent visitation statutes had
inflicted on "good parents,,269 for years. "[T]he Due Process Clause does
not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better'
decision could be made.'.27O Troxel thus fortified the parent's right to
resist vIsItation. In practice, "special weight" seems to have come to
mean the deference strict scrutiny requires. And Troxel brought
recognition of the terrible emotional and financial cost of grandparent
visitation suits for parents and children. As the Troxel legacy continues
to unfold, the post Troxel era can only become brighter.

266 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69. Much of the precedent the Court cites in its discussion of
parental rights, (id. at 65), is also stated in the singular. For example, "[i]t is plain that the interest of
a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'comes to this
Court with a momentum for respect .... '" Id. at 66 (quoting Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972).
267 See, e.g., Butler v. Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 151 (Cal. 2004) (asserting, without analysis, that
the rebuttable presumption in the California statute gives "special weight" to the parental decision if
the parents agree that visitation is not in the child's best interests); id. at 152 (stating that "[n]othing
in the decision in Troxel suggests that an order for grandparent visitation that is supported by one
parent infringes upon the parental rights of the other parent" without acknowledging the fact that
since Troxel analyzes a statute as applied to a single parent any such discussion would be unlikely
in the extreme).
268 Diverse sources have agreed on this characterization of Troxel. See, e.g., Zasueta v.
Zasueta, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245, 254 (Ct. App. 2002); Note, California Supreme Coun finds no

Infringement of Custodial Mother's Due Process Parenting Interest When Noncustodial Father
Suppons Grandparent Visitation Petition - Butler v. Harris (In re Marriage of Harris), 96 P.3d 141
(Cal. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1053 (2005).
269 The Hawk court notes that the lower court in that case referred to the parents being sued
for visitation as "admittedly good parents." Id., 855 S.W. 2d at 577.
270 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73.
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